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　　Immediately following the May 2014 military coup d’état in Thailand, the Obama 
Administration began a series of diplomatic and political actions, partly aimed at pressuring the 
Thai junta to return the country to democratic control. While this short-term democratization 
pressure proved largely unsuccessful, some Obama-era manuevers cast a spotlight on some of 
Thailand’s remaining vulnerabilities to external pressures. This paper analyzes the American 
response to the 2014 Thai military coup, using Levitsky and Way’s (2005) linkage and leverage 
democratization theory as a method of evaluation. The reach of American leverage is discussed 
and potential pressure points are revealed. 
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Introduction
　　On May 22, 2014, Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, the Commander of the Royal Thai Army, 
deposed the caretaker government of Yingluck Shinawatra in a bloodless military coup. In 
the process of upending democratic rule and suspending Thailand’s democracy, the military 
junta also reset bilateral relations with the United States. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, 
concerned about unfolding events, immediately denounced the Army’s incursion into domestic 
affairs, calling it both “disappointing” and “unjustified.１）”  While Obama administration 
officials held out hope that the military would return power to civilian control with free 
elections, it was evident by mid-June that the military was seeking to entrench itself in 
power２）.  Shortly after Kerry’s announcement, the United States began restricting regular 
financial assistance and maneuvered to cancel or scale down joint military cooperation 
exercises (Parameswaran, 2015b). It immediately snubbed Thai military observers from 
attending RIMPAC exercises. (Campbell, 2014) For Obama, the political conditionalities of 
a return to normal diplomatic and political relations with the United States was a specific 
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timetable for a return to a democratically-elected government and the immediate restoration 
of civil and political liberties that were suspended as a result of Yingluck’s removal. 
　　Some of America’s foreign policy concerns in Thailand can be attributed to a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Thai politics. Two contrasting views of the Thai political 
landscape can arguably be seen--and both are somewhat problematic. First, the lead Western 
democratic players witnessed a period of rapid democratic consolidation in Thailand, 
with free and fair elections held in 2001, 2006 and 2011３）.  A vibrant Thai civil society 
emerged during this period and some believed that Thailand was developing a pluralistic, 
participatory democratic culture (Pathmanand, 2001; 27). The darker side of the same coin 
depicts a dormant, yet powerful military with an elite bourgeoisie increasingly frustrated 
by the populist gains of Thaksin Shinawatra, an eccentric billionaire telecommunications 
magnate. 
　　Days before the Thai coup, Amy Searight, Deputy Secretary of Defense for South and 
Southeast Asia, said the U.S. was “reasonably confident” (Beattie, 2014) that there would 
be no military coup, showing optimism in the first paradigm. In keeping with expectations, 
the elite classes believed the Americans would take their cues from 2006--and were 
surprised when they did not. Growing American frustration with Thai excuses for both 
the 2006 and 2014 interventions led to a much stronger American position (Pongsudhirak, 
2016; 65). The White House began to lean heavily on Thailand, convinced that traditional 
leverage could create the necessary conditions to influence Thai foreign policy and return 
the country to democratic control. That leverage is the focus of this paper. This article 
examines U.S. democratization pressures on Thailand following the events of May 2014. 
Obama Administration policy is presented in contrast to traditional bilateral ties, where 
regional security, internal stability and combating terrorism overwhelm democratic interests. 
This paper will examine the failures of U.S. external democratization pressure on Thailand 
with an eye on possibilities for democratic value promotion in an increasingly resistant 
authoritarian environment. To identify prospective pressure points, this article employs 
Levitsky and Way’s (2005) leverage and linkage democratization theory as an evaluative 
mechanism. The article is divided into three sections. First, I detail relevant literature 
post-Cold War democratization and then summarize the history of American leverage on 
Thailand prior to 2014. I then analyze American policy changes after May 2014 and finally, 
outline specific pressures that have had demonstrable results in upholding democratic norms, 
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despite the decline and effectiveness of U.S. leverage. A post-coup analysis of American 
external democratization pressure is particularly relevant in a unique chapter in U.S.-
Thai bilateral relations. The 184-year-old alliance４） has been strained as a result of chronic 
political instability in Thailand and the emergence of China as a regional counterbalance to U.S. 
interests.
Literature and Context
　　Larry Diamond (2014) has argued that democracy has been in retreat and the West has 
overlooked a sustained democratic “recession” that has endured for more than a decade. 
This democratic recession is a stark departure from more than 30 years of democratic 
expansion dating back to 1975. In Southeast Asia, Freedom House indicators for 2017 
indicate a precipitous drop, with Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Malaysia 
receiving equal or lower scores than the previous year. Western illusions about liberal 
values permeating Asian institutions have been replaced by authoritarian governments 
dismantling what remains of democratic pillars. Scholarly literature reveals some of these 
faulty expectations. 
　　Considerable attention has been given to the field of democratization, most notably 
after the tumultuous events of the Cold War (Huntington 1991; Diamond 1999), when it was 
assumed that states with political, economic, and military ties to the former Soviet Union 
would seek greater liberalization. Seismic, structural changes realigned political boundaries 
and a spirited debate emerged about the limitations of external state pressure in influencing 
democratization around the globe, both from a state’s transition from an authoritarian 
regime, or when a state fails to consolidate democracy. Levitsky and Way (2005) proposed 
that the post-Cold War structural environment was influenced by “dimensions”, that both 
Western leverage and linkage increase the cost of authoritarian behavior. (p. 23) Leverage 
is defined as the vulnerability of a state to varieties of external pressure--a function of three 
factors: a) relative size of the military or economy; b) access to support from an alternate 
regional power; and c) competing foreign policy issues on the agendas of states that have 
the potential to exercise external control. This top-down pressure often takes the form of 
political or diplomatic pressure, political conditionalities, punitive sanctions, or a form of 
military intervention. They acknowledge the limitations of the first dimension as a stand 
alone mechanism for exerting external pressure. Weak states were particularly vulnerable 
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to Western leverage, however subtle abuses of state power were left largely unchecked. Yet 
leverage rarely alone has much force in steering the course of democratization. Linkage, or 
bottom-up pressures are needed. Linkage is defined as the strength of state ties and cross-
border flows between a state and the West, or Western-leaning multilateral institutions, 
broken into five separate categories: geopolitical, economic, social, communication, and 
transnational linkages. (Levitsky & Way, 2006; 379)
　　The Thai context provides a challenge for the linkage and leverage concepts, similar 
to many countries experiencing challenges with democratic consolidation. Frustrations at 
the lack of democratization can be attributed to Thailand’s current dissatisfaction with 
democratic systems. While Thailand has institutions that have democratic traditions, it has 
a history of anti-democratic military interventions. The 2014 coup d’état became the 12th 
such intervention since 1932. Further, in June 2014, the ruling Army junta introduced the 
2014 interim Constitution that gave sweeping power to the military, including executive, 
legislative, and judicial authority. (Herman, 2014) Considering these severe restrictions, a 
more realistic assessment of democratization in the Thai context would expand the definition 
of democratization to include adherence to some Western democratic norms. This can 
include some liberalization of government institutions, protecting civil liberties and upholding 
state obligations to international human rights norms. It is important to note the limitations 
of this exercise. Galtung and Scott (2008) define democracy as a “feedback loop between 
rulers and ruled, with signals of consent or dissent, meaning acceptance or rejection. A 
democracy is as good as its feedback loops. Hence, there are degrees, levels of democracy.” 
(p. 3) Thailand’s democratization is a puzzle, and these degrees or levels of democracy are 
complicated and obscured. As Clark Neher (1995) writes, “No nation in Southeast Asia is as 
difficult to evaluate in terms of democracy as Thailand.” (p. 195) The aim is not to evaluate 
the extent of Thailand’s democratization, or attempt to place or categorize Thailand into a 
convenient model “competitive authoritarian” or “hybrid” regime as Levitsky and Way (2010) 
do to other semi-autocratic states. This paper assesses the U.S.-Thai bilateral relationship 
with regard to these expanded democratic norms after May 2014, using the leverage-linkage 
vehicle as an assessment.
　　Thailand has been beset by chronic political instability over the past decade, fractured 
by two divergent political spheres. The Red-Yellow divide in 2009 highlighted social, 
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economic and elite divisions punctuated by delegitimized elections, populist uprisings and 
bloody street violence. Red Shirt protesters, commonly associated with the pro-Thaksin 
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) marched in Bangkok claiming then-
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva took power illegitimately, in collusion with the judiciary and 
the Royal Thai Army. In contrast, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) formed as a 
movement against Thaksin, comprised of the urban middle-class, royalists, and anti-Thaksin 
Southerners. Following the 2014 coup d’état, the UDD populist elements have gone into 
self-imposed hiding--partially out of fear of reprisal or crackdown from a watchful military 
government. Thailand is a “parallel state”, (Briscoe, 2008) one quasi-democratic, and the other 
a military-led Constitutional monarchy putting itself “above politics” yet leveraging its own 
pervasive influence over civil society. External Western actors, seeking to pressure Thailand 
through combinations of linkage and leverage, face a difficult climb.
　　Thailand’s relationship with its long-time American benefactor has ripened. The country 
has emerged as an economic catalyst for ASEAN, and transitioning from ODA recipient to 
an ODA contributor. As Tan (2016) suggests, democratization in this more mature context 
is risky. In an environment where the recipient of assistance has significant leverage, the 
use of any ODA for democracy promotion would likely fail. (p. 155) Thailand fits well into 
this argument. For example, while Thailand values military assistance from the United 
States, it has worked to improve its relationship with China, who in turn is motivated by 
“commercial” and “geostrategic” considerations. (Tan, 2016; 155) The absence or limitations 
of leverage, Tan argues, makes American demands unlikely to succeed. For Western donors, 
options appear limited. Aid, Tan suggests, is better spent on “secondary recipients” who 
do not have the means to counteract external leverage. The deluge of ODA to Myanmar 
tied to democratization after 2010 is a prime example. Democracy promotion is best “at the 
margins” rather than “wasted” on primary, and consequently more authoritarian recipients 
are now less inclined to accept or implement programmes that produce any tangible results. 
The cost of authoritarian behavior remains low.
Democratization and Leverage Before the Coup
　　Thailand has had a long history of difficulties with democratization and the Americans 
have not consistently pressed the issue. Thailand has shifted from “military meddling to 
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democratic reignition” (Farrelly, 2013: 283) since its 1932 Revolution, where the Siamese 
overthrew an absolute monarchy, replacing it with a constitutional version. However, 
evidence of democratization was limited. By 1938, Thailand had lurched toward dictatorship 
and bilateral relations with the United States paused during World War II. Field Marshall 
Plaek Phibunsongkhram, (commonly known as Phibun) a military strongman responsible 
for ending generations of Chakri absolutism, governed with impunity. Thailand soon backed 
Japan and declared war on the United States in 1942. An early bottom-up approach involved 
lending support to the “Free Thai” movement begun by upper middle class Thais educated 
at American institutions, but had little success in uprooting Phibun. (Darling, 1962; 96) 
　　New realities forced the Americans to alter course. In a post-war environment, 
democratization efforts were secondary to competing issues of interest. With seminal 
events in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 
unfolding, the spread of Communism on two fronts occupied American policymakers. As 
many scholars have noted (Farrelly, 2013; Fineman, 1997), the United States recognized-
-albeit reluctantly--the legitimacy of the Phibun government in the face of past wartime 
transgressions because of competing security and balance of power concerns elsewhere. The 
Americans put significant leverage on Phibun to crack down on suspected Communist leftists 
(Fineman, 1997: 260). Although some indications suggest that this was Thai pragmatism at 
work, considering the number of leftist members of the Thai Cabinet at the time and the 
insatiable demand for American military aid. American fears of a Communist menace were 
made manifest by political instability and the unfolding civil war in neighboring Vietnam. 
Thailand’s monarchy later found legitimacy in the convenient security arrangement, with the 
Americans impressing upon both civilian and military governments alike Thailand’s unique 
vulnerabilities. 
　　By the mid-1970s, Thailand had again both flirted with and suppressed democratic urges. 
This period was marked by student uprisings against Thanom Kittikachorn in Bangkok 
in 1973 which resulted in his removal. This was followed by the massacre at Thammasat 
University in October of 1976. The legitimacy gained from these interventions began a period 
of monarchy-military dominance, and the decline of U.S. democratization pressure. While 
Thailand’s institutions left room for free and fair elections, they also allowed for the rise of 
populist billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra in 2000. Thaksin’s populist policies routinely upset 
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the royalist elite class. America wanted Thailand’s cooperation on the Bush Administration’s 
war on terrorism, and became pragmatic when Thaksin escalated his war on drugs and 
military interventions against the separatist insurgency in the restive South. (Chambers, 
2001; 472) His Chinese heritage and disdain for Western-dominated institutions, most notably 
the International Monetary Fund (Kazmin, 2006), ruffled feathers. It was less than surprising 
that when Thaksin was removed in a coup while visiting the United Nations in New York, 
the Bush Administration expressed only mild disappointment in receiving the news. (Baker, 
2006)
Rhetorical and Normative Pressure
　　One month after the May 2014 coup, the Obama Administration made a series of 
diplomatic moves frequently described as “soft sanctions”. In June 2014, the American 
uninvited three military observers to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in Hawaii. 
Kristie Kenney, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand during that period led to widespread 
condemnation of the coup, outlining potential immediate sanctions that would be forthcoming. 
Kenney also hinted the kind of normative pressure that would follow, “encouraging the 
current governing council of Thailand to move power into civilian hands and stop the 
restrictive measures.” (Campbell, 2014) While these bilateral maneuvers are cursory in 
nature, there is a lingering power to normative pressure. American rhetoric toward Thailand 
echoed sentiment from Western partners, including Japan, Australia and the EU, who 
each threatened broader measures provided that democratic rule did not return within a 
structured or agreed upon timeline. While extent of the “soft sanctions” are discussed in the 
next section, the U.S. more frequently used normative and rhetorical pressure as a means 
of delegitimizing the military government. Kenney’s tenure at the Embassy in Bangkok was 
well regarded, as was her public diplomacy. Kenney used her public image to both burnish 
her credentials with the Thai public through social media campaigns (Maxwell, 2014) as 
well as marginalize and isolate Thai autocrats. Her popular Fourth of July party at the U.S. 
Embassy in Bangkok notably did not include any of the Thai junta’s planners. They were 
purposely not invited. (Maxwell, 2014) 
　　Ambassador Kenney’s departure became another medium for American diplomatic 
pressure. The Obama Administration took several months before nominating Glyn Davies, 
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a former special envoy to North Korea. While publicly claiming the appointment would take 
months due to a lengthy Senate confirmation process, Kenney’s departure in November 
2014 and the Davies nomination did not occur until April 2015, followed by confirmation in 
September 2015. Multiple channels were used to distance U.S. diplomats from their Thai 
counterparts, extending to high-level officials at the State Department. Daniel Russel, the U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs publicly censured the junta in 
prepared remarks at Chulalongkorn University in January 2015:
　　 “I’ll be blunt here: When an elected leader is deposed, impeached by the authorities that 
implemented the coup, and then targeted with criminal charges while basic democratic 
processes and institutions are interrupted, the international community is left with the 
impression that these steps could be politically driven. Ending martial law throughout the 
country and removing restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly are important steps 
as part of a genuinely inclusive reform process that reflects the broad diversity of views 
within the country. We hope that the result of that process will be stable, democratic 
institutions that reflect and respond to the will of the Thai people.５）” 
　　Russel called for a “process that reinforces the confidence of the Thai people in 
their government and judicial institutions” and a move toward “stable and participatory 
democracy.” (“Remarks”, 2015) A diplomatic war of words ensued, where Prayut forcefully 
responded to U.S. criticism reiterating that a deterioration of security necessitated the 
coup, which was “done to save Thai democracy.” Thai Foreign Minister General Tanasak 
Patimapragorn allegedly confronted Russel on what he would do if faced with a similar 
security scenario. Perhaps the criticism may have been met with less reaction by Thai 
officials had Russel not met earlier with Yingluck, whom Prayut had three days earlier 
sought to indict on charges of negligence following a failed rice pledging scheme. This 
diplomatic war of words continued well into 2015, when the Administration appointed 
Davies. Thai officials accused the Americans of stalling the appointment and the Americans 
blamed the delay on Congressional approval. But Davies appointment was a continuation 
of American political and diplomatic distance. At the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of 
Thailand, the new Ambassador criticized Thailand’s “lengthy and unprecedented” prison 
sentences under draconian lese majeste laws (Yee, 2015). Pressure came from Davies and 
from royalists, who demanded that the Royal Thai Police investigate the Ambassador for 
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defamation of the Thai monarchy. Despite the significant political positioning and rhetorical 
distance between the Americans and Thailand, there was an eagerness to restore normal 
relations with the Americans, with Thai Ambassador to the U.S., Pisan Manapawat publicly 
calling for a renewal of a partnership with “shared outcomes.” (Pennington, 2015) U.S. officials 
also began to soften their tone. Davies, prior to the 2016 Cobra GOLD exercise rejected 
claims that diplomatic ties were on hold and by 2017, the bulk of rhetoric centered on the U.S. 
being a “reliable” partner. 
Post-Coup U.S. Military-Economic Pressure 
　　Within hours of Yingluck Shinawatra’s removal from power, the United States 
immediately began targeting Thailand’s vulnerabilities to leverage through a review of 
military assistance programs to Thailand. Obama immediately restricted funding for 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a mechanism by which countries can purchase defense 
capabilities in the form of articles, services, equipment, and training through financing or 
through commercial contracts. Prior to 2014, Thailand received as much as $1.6 million in 
financing; however partly due to restrictions placed upon it by the U.S. Foreign Assistance 
Act, Thailand was now cut off. Similar actions were taken with $1.3 million in International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) funding, which provides training to improve the 
conduct of foreign militaries--including fostering respect for human rights and democratic 
values. In total, more than $4.7 million in FMF and IMET dollars were suspended. 
(Parameswaran, 2015a) Participation in the annual Cobra GOLD exercises slowed, with just 
3,600 U.S. troops participating in 2017. The Defense Department cancelled the CARAT 
Naval training (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) and Hanuman Guardian joint 
army exercises and withdrew a planned visit by U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral 
Harry Harris. (“U.S. Cancels Military Exercise”, 2014)  The reaction in Bangkok was one of 
disappointment, if not shock. The military junta expressed its regret in the outward policy 
shift, noting that the Obama Administration was seeking to expand ties with Cuba under 
Raul Castro, and negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran, while also arguing against further 
economic sanctions. 
　　Washington’s pullback had an additional consequence. Because of the protracted delays 
in military assistance financing and reduced joint military cooperation exercises, Thailand 
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began courting China as a potential balance to the United States. Chinese Defense Minister 
Chang Wanquan visited Thailand in February 2015 in an effort to boost Sino-Thai relations, 
agreeing to conduct joint military exercises within the next five years (Parameswaran, 
2015c). In that same meeting, Chang also agreed to give Thailand favorable prices on military 
hardware. (Lefevre, 2015) In late 2016, the two countries discussed the possibility of a joint 
military production facility and additional cooperation in traditional U.S. dominated areas of 
anti-terrorism, personnel exchanges and training exercises (Parameswaran, 2015c). In 2017, 
Thailand purchased three Chinese submarines for $393 million and 10 Norinco VT4 main 
battle tanks for $58 million, replacing older U.S. models. 
　　The growing relationship between the Prayut government and the Chinese served to 
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of U.S. conventional pressures. Prawit Wongsuwan, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Defense Minister noted, “China will not intervene in Thailand’s politics 
but will give political support and help maintain relationships at all levels. This is China’s 
policy.” This underscores weakness in U.S. leverage. Policy pressure backed by rhetorical 
pressure resulted in a political stalemate--and when Prayut met with Chinese officials himself, 
he reiterated the Thai position that Washington “does not understand the way we work,” 
(Lefevre, 2015) a rebuttal to the constant haranguing by U.S. diplomats. Yet, the Americans 
have had fair warning. Wikileaks-intercepted cables demonstrate U.S. ineptitude on growing 
Chinese influence in Thailand dating back to 2006. A senior Chinese Colonel told a U.S. 
diplomat that the Chinese tactic of telling Thailand, “China is your neighbor, we will be here 
long-term, we will not interfere in your internal affairs,” would give China a competitive 
advantage. (Schulberg, 2014) 
　　China’s growing counterbalance to the United States not only demonstrates a lack 
of consistency on the part of two consecutive U.S. administrations, but elucidates the 
ineffectiveness of traditional leverage without the presence of significant linkage. In the 
modern context, the cocktail of Chinese Communism and royalist fears of a northern 
insurgency are stale. The growing economic and military power of contemporary China not 
only serve as a convenient partner for the ruling junta, but the benefits of partnership are too 
alluring to ignore. Since 2008, bilateral trade has grown exponentially, with China becoming 
Thailand’s most important trading partner. The relationship is more significant of late, as 
China’s partnership with Thailand exceeds all other ASEAN countries. More than $26.5 
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billion in Thai goods were exported to China (OEC, 2015) and Thailand represents small, but 
significant regional destination for Chinese imports. Thailand and China have strengthened 
bilateral relations, resulting in rapid foreign direct investment flow into Thailand. China is 
the second largest investor in Thailand after Japan. Part of China’s investment is diplomatic, 
but it sees Thailand as a hub for trade in Southeast Asia. Part of the diplomatic component 
is a willingness on the part of Chinese investors to wait out political turmoil and uncertainty. 
While applications for new foreign investors fell from 3,469 projects in 2014 to just 1,038 
in 2015, Chinese FDI for 2016 totaled more than 15 percent of all foreign investment (BOI, 
2016). In the short term, Thailand is reliant on Chinese business. Political uncertainties have 
created a sluggish economy that grew only by 0.8 per cent in 2014 and up to 3.2 per cent in 
2016. The World Bank projects flat growth in 2018 and 2019, weaker than most of Southeast 
Asia (Villadiego, 2017). 
Economics, Human Trafficking and Linkage
　　Levitsky and Way (2010) have suggested that the West have typically defaulted 
on democratization when weighing the potential consequences with strategic partners. 
Energy producing states, geostrategic partners, and major trade partners have had wide 
latitude from the West. Punitive considerations are largely not a part of Western leverage. 
Yet, combined with economic linkages, there is evidence that Thailand has adhered to 
some democratic norms. The extent of regime compliance is ostensibly proportional to 
the consistency of American foreign policy. Two recent accounts provide support to this 
argument. Thailand’s deep civil society connections to international human rights NGOs 
amplify leverage with transnational linkages. Social and communication linkages, both from 
Thai communities abroad and through civil society organizations have been effective in 
pushing for meaningful social and political changes. International pressure, through intensive 
social and communication linkages have been documented in recent human trafficking 
scandals, which plagued Charoen Pokphand Foods (CP) and four other international food 
retailers. CP bought fishmeal from local suppliers that operated fishing vessels manned by 
slave labor. In a separate case, the Natural Fruit Company owned pineapple processing 
plant was accused in a Finnish NGO report of a number of human rights violations, including 
forced labour and physical and emotional abuse. These are not isolated cases. 
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　　Thailand has been considered both a transit country and major destination for human 
trafficking and has only made incremental progress in resolving the problem. The United 
States has used the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) as leverage. The 
European Union (EU) issued a “yellow card” to Thailand in early 2015 over its unregulated 
fishing and poor treatment of migrant workers. In previous reports, Thailand was granted 
two waivers under the Trafficking Victims Prevention Act (TVPA) in 2012 and 2013, on 
the condition that it would meet the minimum standard for the elimination or reduction of 
trafficking before the issuance of the following report. The 2014 Report notes that 225 people 
were convicted under the Thai 2008 anti-trafficking law in 2013, but efforts were “insufficient 
compared with the size of the problem in Thailand, and corruption at all levels hampered the 
success of these efforts.” Consequently, Thailand did not meet the requirements following 
2013 and defaulted into Tier 3 status for 2014. The result of these normative measures 
usually leads to a degree of compliance. In response to the EU and U.S. downgrades, the 
junta took measures to arrest more than 100 people in the first ten months since punitive 
warnings from the West were issued.
　　The U.S. State Department did not downgrade Thailand for purely political reasons, 
however political considerations did play a key role in both a downgrade to Tier 3 and 
the recent upgrade to the Tier 2 Watch List. Russell, after his remarks at Chulalongkorn 
repeated American democratic norms in an interview with the New York Times, but also 
threatened Thailand would not regain its previous stature. An investigation by Reuters 
(Szep & Spetalnick, 2015), however, demonstrates how political considerations render U.S. 
leverage and linkage mechanisms either less effective or moot. Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking In Persons (J/TIP) recommendations were repeatedly overruled by American 
diplomats on more than a dozen country ratings, including Thailand. Diplomatic efforts to 
upgrade Thailand from the Tier 2 Watch List were well documented, including reports that 
both Thailand and Malaysia were candidates for removal due to geopolitical considerations, 
namely negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP (Szep & Spetalnick, 2015). 
TPP was an essential part of the Obama Administration’s pivot to Asia. The maneuver 
prompted an outcry from civil society organizations who had lobbied the U.S. Congress for 
months on Thailand’s TIP status. The 2016 TIP Report eventually upgraded Thailand’s 
standing, which was received positively by the junta, which expressed greater optimism 
about joining the Partnership, despite legitimate concerns over intellectual property and 
｜ 39 ｜
Evaluating U.S. Democratization Pressure on Post-Coup Thailand
agriculture. 
　　The U.S. retreat on normative pressure sent a mixed message to Bangkok. Political 
inconsistency, particularly on the 2015 removal of Malaysia from Tier 3 status, suggests that 
economic concerns are again paramount to U.S. interests. The lack of normative pressure, 
in the immediate term, some NGOs have argued, have relaxed Thailand’s pursuit of human 
trafficking violators. The Environmental Justice Foundation reported that the number of 
human trafficking convictions decreased from 206 in 2014 to 169 in 2015. This evidence, 
however contrasts with a recent Thai criminal court in July 2017, sentencing 62 people to 
prison for ill-treatment of Rohingya migrants, including a former Royal Thai Army advisor 
Lt. Gen. Manas Kongpan, who was given a 27 year term. (“Trafficking Convictions”, 2017). 
Further evidence suggests Prayut has overreacted in compliance efforts. In June 2017, Prayut 
issued the Decree on the Management of Foreign Workers Act, restricting undocumented 
foreign workers in Thailand. Potential violators would face fines of up to 800,000 baht 
($24,100). Employers may be fined 4,000 baht ($120) for every foreign employee performing 
a duty other than what is detailed in the assigned work visa. Leverage, when social and 
communication linkages are applied enable civil society actors to mobilize against powerful 
state and corporate interests. Local NGOs frequently interacted with larger international 
organizations to raise awareness about Thailand’s insufficient labor standards and practices. 
These actors have increased the effectiveness of external pressure by state actors, including 
the United States. Western pressure, more effectively applied in the EU case, mandated 
economic and democratic reforms. In the case of human trafficking, the Thai government 
was much more willing to conform to international norms, or at the minimum, actors were 
able to compel Thai officials and domestic actors to examine trafficking policies. Normative 
pressure, via the TIP, was an effective “pressure point”. It supports the claim that economic 
leverage, combined with sufficient linkages will increase the cost of authoritarian behavior. 
Conclusion
　　This paper has demonstrated that traditional forms of U.S. leverage in the Thai context, 
evidenced in diplomatic rhetorical and normative pressures have limited effects, if not met 
with significant linkages. Evidence also suggests that any leverage employed, either through 
economic sanctions, a re-evaluation of political and military ties must also be complemented 
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by appropriate linkages, follow-up, and coordination. American diplomatic pressure was 
not without consequences. In the absence of U.S. engagement, Thailand sought legitimacy 
and stronger political ties with China. While economic pressure through TIP status and a 
complementary “yellow card” by the European Union put significant stress on Thailand’s 
economic outlook, American inconsistency (through issues of competing interest) undermined 
these efforts. 
　　Speculation about U.S. policy toward Thailand after the 2016 Presidential campaign 
decreased after two significant post-inaugural events. Prayut accepted President Donald 
Trump’s invitation to visit the United States, almost immediately after offering the same 
courtesy to Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte. The Trump Administration has not 
shown the same interest in the Obama-era “pivot” to Asia, withdrawing from TPP. These 
developments may indicate a return to a traditional U.S.-Thai bilateral relationship, both 
pragmatic and transactional. Yet, these moves also indicate an unraveling of normative 
pressure. The withdrawal from TPP provides China additional bilateral linkages with 
Thailand, similar to that of its neighbors in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s trade surplus is 
estimated at $18.9 billion. While the Trump administration has criticized Thailand and others 
as “cheaters,” (Korte, 2017) U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s August 2017 visit did 
not reveal any economic policy changes. More importantly, any possible shift in bilateral 
trade policy will not come with Obama-era strings. Scholars have noted that the warming 
relationship is an attempt to rebalance a strained relationship with China now the primary 
actor (Yee, 2017). Normative pressure will likely be replaced by security policy priorities, 
as American preoccupation with events in the South China Sea and North Korean nuclear 
ambitions.
Notes
１）Secretary of State John Kerry’s Statement on the Coup in Thailand, Washington, DC, May 22, 2014
２）Sentiments shared in testimony by Scot Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific, June 24, 2014
３）Elections were held in 2007, but were marred by allegations of fraud and vote buying.
４）The Thai-U.S. relationship dates back to March 20, 1833 with the signing of the Treaty of Amity 
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and Commerce.
５）Remarks of Assistant Secretary Daniel Russel, Institute of Security and International Studies, 
Chulalongkorn University, January 26, 2015
References
Baker, Peter. (2006) “Ideals and Realities Clash In Bush ‘Freedom Agenda’.” The Washington Post. WP 
Company, Web. Accessed 27 June, 2017.
Beattie, V. (2014). US ‘reasonably confident’ no military coup in Thailand. Lanham: Federal Information 
& News Dispatch, Inc. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1524247951?account
id=27740, Accessed 27 July, 2017.
Briscoe, Ivan. (2008), “The Proliferation of the ‘Parallel State’,” Madrid: FRIDE, Fundación para las 
Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Working Paper 71, October. http://www.fes-
seguridadregional.org/images/stories/docs/4432-001_g.pdf, Accessed 18 July, 2017.
Campbell, Charlie. (2014) “The U.S. Is Freezing the Thai Junta Out of Military Exercises.” Time. 26 June 
2014. Web. Accessed 11 July. 2017.
Chaichalearmmongkol, Nopparat. (2015), “Thailand Disputes its Human Trafficking Designation”, Wall 
Street Journal, 28 July 2015. Web. Accessed 15 June, 2017
Chambers, Paul. (2004), “U.S.-Thai Relations after 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Journal of 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(3), 460-479. 
Chambers, Paul and Waitoolkiat, Napisa. (2016), “The Resilience of Monarchised Military in Thailand,” 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3), 425-444.
Darling, Frank. (1962). “American Policy in Thailand,” The Western Political Quarterly, 15(1), 93-110. 
Diamond, Jared, (2015), “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141-155.
Farrelly, Nicholas, (2013). “Why democracy struggles: Thailand’s elite coup culture,” Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, 67(3), 281-296.
Fineman, Daniel, (1997), “A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in 
Thailand, 1947-1958,” University of Hawaii Press. 
Freedman, Amy. (2006), “Thailand’s Missed Opportunity for Democratic Consolidation,” Japanese Journal 
of Political Science, 7(2), 175-193.
Freedman, Amy. (2007), “Consolidation or Withering Away of Democracy? Political Changes in Thailand 
and Indonesia,” Asian Affairs, 33(4), 195-216. 
Galtung, Johan and Scott, Paul. (2008) “Democracy. Peace. Development”, Transcend University Press. 
Herman, Steve. (2014)  “Thai Junta Unveils Temporary Constitution.” VOA, VOA, 23 July 2014, www.
｜ 42 ｜
Mark S. Cogan
voanews.com/a/thai-junta-unveils-temporary-constitution/1963363.html, Accessed 18 July, 2017.
Herman, S. (2016). Geopolitics still seen swaying human trafficking report. Lanham: Federal Information 
& News Dispatch, Inc. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1800520008?account
id=27740
Kazmin, Amy, (2006), “Thailand’s Thaksin Warns of Return to IMF Aid,” Financial Times, https://www.
ft.com/content/eb867e22-b7fe-11da-bfc5-0000779e2340, Accessed 18 July, 2017
Lefevre, Amy, (2015), “Thailand accuses U.S. of meddling in its politics,” Reuters, 28 January, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-politics-idUSKBN0L10YZ20150128, Accessed 19 July, 
2017
Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold 
War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan, (2006). Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International 
Dimension of Regime Change. Comparative Politics, 38(4), 379-400. 
Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan, (2005), “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of 
Democracy, 16(3), 20-33.
Maxwell, Daniel. “Kristie Kenney Departure Leaves Thailand without a US Ambassador,” Asian 
Correspondent. 10 Nov. 2014. Web. Accessed 1 September, 2017.
Neher, C. (1995). Democratization in Thailand. Asian Affairs, 21(4), 195-209. 
Pathmanand, Ukrist, (2001), Globalization and Democratic Development in Thailand: The New Path of 
the Military, Private Sector, and Civil Society. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 23(1), 24-42. 
Parameswaran, Prashanth. (2015a), “Did China Just Boost Military Ties with Thailand?” The Diplomat, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/did-china-just-boost-military-ties-with-thailand, Accessed 15 July 
2017. 
Parameswaran, Prashanth (2015b) . “US-Thailand Relations and Cobra Gold 2015: What’s Really Going 
On?” The Diplomat, 5 Feb. 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/u-s-thailand-relations-and-cobra-
gold-2015-whats-really-going-on, Accessed 19 July 2017.
Parameswaran, Prashanth. (2015c), “China, Thailand Mull Joint Military Production Facility” The 
Diplomat, 20 December, 2015, Web. Accessed 17 July 2017. 
Pennington, Matthew (2015) “Tensions Test U.S.-Thai Relations as Strategic Talks Resume,” The Japan 
Times. 15 Dec. 2015. Web. Accessed 13 July. 2017.
Pongsudhirak, Thitinan, (2016), “An Unaligned Alliance: Thailand-U.S. Relations in the Early 21st 
Century,” Asian Politics & Policy, 8(1), 63-74. 
Remarks of Assistant Secretary Daniel Russel, Institute of Security and International Studies, 
Chulalongkorn University, January 26, 2015
Schulberg, Jessica, (2014), “The Military Coup in Thailand Is Putting the U.S. in an Awkward Position,” 
｜ 43 ｜
Evaluating U.S. Democratization Pressure on Post-Coup Thailand
New Republic, 24 May, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/117894/thailand-coup-foreign-
assistance-act-put-us-awkward-position, Accessed 19 July, 2017.
Szep, Jason, & Matt Spetalnick. “State Department Is Accused of Watering down Human Trafficking 
Report｜The Japan Times.” The Japan Times. 4 Aug. 2015. Web. 1 Sept. 2017.
Tan, Benn Sang, (2015), “Aid and democracy promotion in Asia,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 
1(2), 152–170.
Testimony of Scot Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 
24, 2014
Thailand Bank of Investment (BOI) Foreign Registered Capital from Major Countries Statistics, 2016
“Thailand: Tier 2 Watchlist”, 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
State, 2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271345.pdf, Accessed 20 August 2017.
“Thailand: Tier 2 Watchlist”, 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
State, 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258882.pdf, Accessed 24 August 2017.
“Thailand: Tier 3”, 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 
2015), https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2015/index.htm, Accessed 18 July 2017.
“Thailand: Tier 3”, 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 
2014), https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/index.htm, Accessed 18 July 2017.
“Thailand: Trafficking Convictions Important Step Forward.” Human Rights Watch., 24 July 2017. Web. 
“U.S. cancels military exercise, visits after Thai coup.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 24 May 2014, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-protests-usa/u-s-cancels-military-exercise-visits-after-thai-coup-
idUSBREA4N0AJ20140524.
“U.S. Embassy Snubs Top Brass with No Invite for July 4,” The Straits Times. 30 June 2014. Web. 
Accessed 5 September 2017.
Villadiego, Laura. “Thailand Chases Chinese Money, but at What Cost?” South China Morning Post. 
South China Morning Post, 23 July 2017. Web. Accessed 5 September 2017.
Yee, Tan Hui. “Tillerson Visits Thailand with Focus on Ties and Pyongyang,” The Straits Times. 9 Aug. 
2017. Web. Accessed 5 September 2017.
Yee, Tan Hui. “US Ambassador to Thailand Glyn Davies under probe for lese majeste,” The Straits 
Times. 9 Dec. 2015. Web. Accessed 7 September 2017.
 （Mark S. Cogan　外国語学部講師）
